UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-10-2014

State v. Ortega Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40682

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ortega Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40682" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4566.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4566

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA...,!....A-..;---~
STATE OF IDAHO,

COpy

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ANTHONY EDWARD ORTEGA,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

No. 40682

)
)
)
)
)
)

Ada Co. Case No.
CR-2012-6872

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
BOise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ............................................................................. 1
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 7
I.

II.

Ortega Has Failed To Show Error In The District
Court's I.R.E. 404(b) Ruling ...................................................... 7
A.

Introduction ..................................................................... 7

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 7

C.

Ortega Has Failed To Show Error In The
District Court's I.R.E. 404(b) Ruling .............................. 7

Ortega Has Failed To Establish The Court Committed
Instructional Error When It Denied His Request For An
Unapproved Jury Instruction .................................................... 13
A.

Introduction ................................................................... 13

B.

Standard Of Review ..................................................... 13

C.

Ortega's Instructional Error Claim Fails ........................ 13

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ........................................................................ 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................. 9
State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 978 P.2d 227 (1999) ............................................ 8
State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532,817 P.2d 646 (1991) ..................................... 13
State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 898 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1995) ....................... 10
State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 785 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1989) .............................. 8
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185 (2009) .............................................. 7
State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 75 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2003) ............. 16, 17
State v. Hassett, 124 Idaho 357,859 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1993) ................... 10, 12
State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987) ...................................... 13
State v. Peters, 116 Idaho 851 (Ct. App. 1989) ............................................ 14, 15
State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993) ....................................... 8
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (2009) .................................... 13
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,77 P.3d 956 (2003) ......................................... 8
State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714,249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) ......................... 7
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 26 P.3d 31 (2001) ............................................... 13
State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370,64 P.3d 296 (2003) ............................... 14, 16, 17

STATUTES
I. C. § 18-1 01 ....................................................................................................... 16
I.C. § 18-1501 ......................................................................................... 11, 15, 16

ii

RULES

I.R.E. 403 ............................................................................................................ 12
I.R.E. 404(b) ................................................................................................ passim

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Anthony Edward Ortega appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of felony injury to child. Ortega contends
the district court erred in allowing the admission of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and in
failing to give a non-pattern jury instruction that he requested.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Ortega called 911 to report he was helping his two-year-old son, AJ.O.,
out of the car seat when AJ.O. slipped and fell and that he thought AJ.O.'s arm
was broken.

(Trial Tr., p.110, Ls.1-23, p.198, Ls.2-4; Exhibit 1.)

When

paramedics arrived on scene, they found AJ.O. lying on the ground and Ortega
standing nearby. (Trial Tr., p.136, L21 - p.137, L.4.) AJ.O. was "crying quite a
bit," was not moving his left arm, and his left palm was face down on the ground.
(Trial Tr., p.137, L 13.) Paramedic Brena McKenna noticed AJ.O.'s arm had a
red band "just above the radius and the ulna," that was a couple of inches wide
and there was swelling.

(Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.18-24.)

When asked what

happened, Ortega claimed he was trying to lift AJ.O. out of his car seat when
A.J.O.'s leg "must have got caught" and AJ.O. fell on the ground and landed on
his left arm.

(Tr., p.138, L17 - p.139, L.1.)

However, Paramedic McKenna

noted the car seat was "strapped in correctly" and she "didn't see any straps or
anything on the floor." (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.5-11.) Paramedics placed a splint on
AJ.O.'s arm, secured him on a gurney, and transported him to the hospital.
(Trial Tr., p.139, L18 - p.141, L13, p.142, Ls.15-23, p.144, Ls.10-13.)
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At the hospital, Dr. Steven Wyman examined AJ.O.

(Trial Tr., p.255,

Ls.17-22, p.260, Ls.7-11.) That examination revealed that AJ.O. had a spiral
fracture of his left arm - a type of fracture that is not common in children and
would not commonly occur as a result of a fall from a car as described by
Ortega.

(Trial Tr., p.270, LA - p.273, L2.) Rather, spiral fractures generally

occur as a result of the arm being "trapped" or "held and turned as the child was
falling, or grabbed, or something of that nature." (Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.3-10.)
Dr. Wyman also noted AJ.O. had "unusual bruising" on his "right upper
extremity and the buttocks." (Trial Tr., p.263, Ls.3-6, p.277, Ls.5-7.) In addition,
there was "linear bruising" on AJ.O.'s right arm that was "suspicious for possibly
like a hand print."

(Trial Tr., p.277, Ls.2-4.)

Because of AJ.O.'s injuries, Dr.

Wyman was not "comfortable discharging [him] home." (Trial Tr., p.273, LS.1S19.) Dr. Wyman, therefore, "asked to speak with the pediatrician so that the
child could be admitted and additional workup and evaluation could be done."
(Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.20-24.)
Law enforcement was also dispatched to the hospital to investigate
further. (Trial Tr., p.223, L23 - p.224, L24.) Upon arrival, Officer David Gomez
interviewed Ortega who told him he was trying to train AJ.O. to get out of the car
by himself and "grabbed" him by the left hand as AJ.O. was getting out of the
car. (Trial Tr., p.225, L.5 - p.226, LA.) Ortega said he was distracted for a "brief
second" and when he "brought his attention back, [AJ.O.] had fallen on the
ground." (Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.5-S.) Ortega repeated a similar story to others.
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(Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.13-18, p.288, L.17 - p.289, L.3, p.337, L.15 - p.338, L.2,
p.368, Ls.2-8.)
A day after A.J.O. was admitted to the hospital, he was examined by Dr.
Paul McPherson, the medical director at CARES.
p.296, Ls.6-13.)

(Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.13-23,

Dr. McPherson obtained a history from A.J.O.'s great

grandmother, Carma Pirrong, who said she had "seen bruises before for about a
month-and-a-half on A.J."1

(Trial Tr., p.298, Ls.12-21.)

Dr. McPherson also

received information about Ortega's explanation of A.J.O.'s arm fracture and
claim that A.J.O. had bruises on his buttocks from sitting on the toilet
seat during potty-training efforts.

(Trial Tr., p.299, L.3 - p.300, L.5.)

Dr.

McPherson agreed with Dr. Wyman that a spiral fracture is generally the result of
a twisting mechanism and is "less likely" to occur by falling. (Trial Tr., p.301, L.9
- p.302, LA.)

Dr. McPherson explained that the "amount of force that would

have taken to cause that kind of fracture is more than if you were just picking
your child up by under the arm or elbow during normal play or normal care."
(Trial Tr., p.320, L.25 - p.321, LA.)

In fact, the "amount of force required to

cause such an injury is enough that a reasonable person would know that they
could harm a child." (Trial Tr., p.321, Ls.5-7.)
Dr. McPherson also noted A.J.O.'s numerous bruises - including bruises
on A.J.O.'s buttocks, chest, and abdomen.
Exhibits 6-9, 25-28.)

(Trial Tr., p.313, L.9 - p.314, L.6;

Those bruises are "[v]ery uncommon in kids, even from

1 A.J.O. did not have the verbal skills to explain how he was injured. (Trial Tr.
p.298, L.22 - p.299, L.2.)

3

accidental falls or household falls." (Trial Tr., p.313, L.9 - p.314, L.5.) Further,
testing showed that A.J.O. does not have a bleeding disorder that would explain
his bruises nor did he have a bone disease. (Trial Tr., p.315, Ls.7-24, p.320,
Ls.7-17.) Like the spiral fracture, the amount of force necessary to cause the
bruises observed on A.J.O. "could have likely caused great bodily harm." (Trial
Tr., p.321, Ls.8-15.)

Accordingly, like Dr. Wyman, Dr. McPherson was also

concerned about A.J.O.'s safety. (Trial Tr., p.320, LS.17 -19.)
Based on A.J.O.'s fractured arm and his bruises, a grand jury indicted
Ortega on two counts of felony injury to child.

(R., pp.22-23.) The state also

filed an Information Part II alleging Ortega is a persistent violator. (R., pp.55-55,
50-52.)
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to use evidence pursuant to
I.R.E.404(b). (R., pp.71-72.) Specifically, the state sought to present evidence
from Byron Stewart that Ortega previously "grabb[ed] his son A.J.O. by the bicep
and yank[ed] him around." (R., pp.71-72.) The state asserted the evidence was
admissible under LR.E. 404(b) to "prove knowledge, and/or to rebut any claim of
accidental touching."

(R., pp.71-72.)

The court granted the state's motion.

(10/15/2012 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25.) Ortega filed a motion to reconsider, arguing
Stewart was not present at the scene of this accident and he has no direct
knowledge of the events leading to the injury" and that his "testimony is not
relevant to whether Mr. Ortega committed the crime as alleged in Count I of the
indictment and would serve to improperly paint Mr. Ortega as an abusive father."
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(R., p.88.) Ortega further objected to testimony from A.J.O.'s grandmother and

great-grandmother regarding other disciplinary actions Ortega took against
A.J.O.

(R., p.88.)

Ortega argued the evidence was inadmissible because it

could not and "has not been directly linked to the injuries as stated in Count
Two." (R., p.88.) The court denied Ortega's motion to reconsider. (10/22/2012
Tr., p.21, Ls.1-5.)
The jury found Ortega guilty of both counts alleged in the Indictment and
.

also found he is a persistent violator. (R., pp.140-141, 144.) The court imposed
unified sentences of ten-years with five years fixed on both counts and ordered
the sentences to run concurrent. (R., pp.148-150.) Ortega filed a timely notice
of appeal. (R., pp.153-155.)
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ISSUES

Ortega states the issues on appeal as:
1. Whether the district court erred by allowing the State to present
evidence of prior bad acts that were irrelevant to any legitimate
issues.
2. Whether the district court erred by not giving the requested jury
instruction on reasonable parenting efforts.
(Appellant's Brief, pA.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Ortega failed to show error in the district court's I.R.E. 404(b) ruling?

2.
Has Ortega failed to show the district court erred in declining his request
for an unapproved jury instruction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Ortega Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b) Ruling
A.

Introduction
Ortega complains that the district court erred in allowing evidence of "prior

bad acts" because, he argues, he did "not put intent at issue" nor was "'absence
of accident' implicated in this case." (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-8.) A review of the
record and the law shows otherwise. Ortega has, therefore, failed to show error
in the district court's I.R.E. 404(b) ruling.

B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,51,205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009).

C.

Ortega Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's I.R.E. 404(b)
Ruling
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a

defendant's criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible for
a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Truman, 150
Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
purposes include proof of motive,

opportunity,
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intent,

Other proper

preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v.
Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83,
87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). As long as the evidence is relevant to
prove some issue other than the defendant's character and its probative value
for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair
prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d
227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,275-76,77 P.3d 956,964-65 (2003).
On appeal, Ortega argues evidence of his prior disciplinary actions
against A.J.O. was inadmissible because, he claims, he "did not put intent at
issue" and his claim that A.J.O.'s arm was broken as a result of an accident, "did
not implicate the question of intent." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) As an initial
matter, Ortega does not identify in his argument what evidence he claims was
not properly admitted. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7 -9.) While he details
various testimony in the factual background section of his brief (Appellant's Brief,
pp.2-3), nowhere does he explain why each prior act was allegedly inadmissible;
instead, he generally characterizes all of the testimony about his conduct as
evidence of his "parenting techniques" and claims such evidence was not
admissible.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

Distinguishing between the acts is,

however, necessary for purposes of determining their relevance and, in one
instance, the admission of the testimony was during cross-examination and,
therefore, was invited by Ortega.
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Although the state sought a pre-trial ruling on whether it could admit
testimony from Stewart that he previously saw Ortega grab AJ.O. by the "bicep
and yank[] him around" (R., p.71), and the district court concluded that evidence
would be admissible, the prosecutor never asked Stewart about that particular
2

incident on direct-examination (see generally Trial Tr., pp.184-193).
Ortega inquired about the incident on cross-examination, asking:

Instead,

"in terms of

any contact with AJ.'s arm, the last time that you indicate you saw [Ortega] do
anything with AJ.'s arm was in January of 2012; correct?"

(Trial Tr., p.194,

Ls.10-14.) It was not until after that the prosecutor followed up on redirect and
asked Stewart to describe what it was he saw Ortega do to AJ.O.'s arm. (Trial
Tr., p.195, Ls.3-3-16.)

Stewart testified that Ortega was trying to get AJ.O.'s

attention and "grabbed him by his arm, and he, you know, snapped him around
so that he would, instead of running away from him, was facing him in a quick
jerk motion." (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.12-16.) Thus, although the district court had
previously ruled the evidence was admissible, the introduction of the evidence
was invited by Ortega himself; as a result, he should be foreclosed from
complaining of any error in relation to its admission. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho
389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000) (a party is estopped, under the doctrine

The prosecutor did, however, ask Stewart about an incident in which Ortega
slapped AJ.O. in the mouth, causing his lips and gums to bleed and that Ortega
had also left a mark on Stewart's son's neck from disciplining him. (Trial Tr.,
p.187, L.3 - p.188, L.10.) Stewart also testified that he saw Ortega "swat
[AJ.O.] on the butt a couple times, but it was really nothing more than ... an
attention getter" and that Ortega "would sometimes leave AJ. on the potty and
on the toilet for extended periods of time, which [Stewart] felt was unnecessary."
(Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.3-19.)
2
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of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the
party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was error); see State v. Gardiner,
127 Idaho 156, 162,898 P.2d 615, 621 (Ct. App. 1995) (testimony of prior acts
admissible after defense "opened the door").
Even if Ortega's complaint regarding Stewart's testimony about the prior
incident involving Ortega grabbing AJ.O.'s arm was not invited, contrary to
Ortega's claim, it was relevant to rebut Ortega's claim that AJ.O.'s broken arm
was the result of an accident rather than the result of Ortega intentionally
grabbing AJ.O. by the arm to remove him from the car or for some other
disciplinary purpose. Ortega's claim that such testimony would only be relevant
if he "grabbed the victim's arm to get his attention (engaged in the action with
innocent intent)" lacks merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) State v. Hassett, 124 Idaho
357, 859 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1993), is instructive and supports the district court's
conclusion that the evidence was relevant.
In Hassett, the defendant was charged with felony injury to child as a
result of injuries sustained by his month-old son. 124 Idaho at 358, 859 P.2d at
956.

Hassett claimed the infant's various injuries were the result of either

accidents or his efforts to aid the child.

kL. at 359-360,

859 P.2d at 957-958. To

refute this claim, the district court allowed the state to admit evidence of prior
abuse Hassett inflicted on his four-month-old daughter. 124 Idaho at 360-361,
859 P.2d at 958-959.
admissible, noting:

The Court of Appeals agreed the evidence was

"Given the contradictory evidence and the variety of
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defenses asserted by Hassett, the issues of intent and absence of accident or
mistake were directly at issue." The Court further reasoned:
Hassett was charged with violating I.C. § 18-1501(1) and
willfully causing or permitting: J.H. to suffer; or inflicting upon him
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering; or causing or
permitting him to be placed in a situation endangering him or his
health when in Hassett's care or custody.
The question of
Hassett's intent, expressed as "willful" action in the statute and in
the prosecutor's charging document, make Hassett's intent
material, and opens the door for introduction of evidence of prior
bad acts offered by [the I.R.E. 404(b) witnesses].
Hassett, 124 Idaho at 362, 859 P.2d at 960.
As in Hassett, the state charged Ortega with violating I.C. § 18-1501(1),
alleging he "willfully caus[ed] or permit[ted] [AJ.O.] to suffer unjustifiable physical
pain or mental suffering." (R., pp.22-23.) Ortega's intent was, therefore, at issue
and evidence related to his intent and to the absence of mistake or accident in
relation to AJ.O.'s broken arm (Count I) was relevant and admissible. Ortega's
claim to the contrary fails.
Ortega's claim that any other evidence of his "parenting techniques" was
inadmissible also fails.

Again, evidence of Ortega's sometimes-aggressive

disciplinary acts was relevant to his intent in relation to Count II, which was
based on the bruises on AJ.O.'s buttocks, abdomen, and chest (R., p.23), and
contradicted Ortega's assertion that the bruising on the buttocks was merely the
result of sitting on a toilet seat during potty training exercises.
Ortega's claim that the prior act evidence was inadmissible because he
does not think his intent or the absence of mistake or accident were implicated in
this case is belied by the record and is unsupported by the law.

11

Ortega next argues that, even if the evidence was relevant, it was
"minimally probative as to the injuries alleged in the indictment, considering none
of the witnesses offering the propensity evidence testified that they saw Mr.
Ortega do anything to cause those injuries." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) This
argument is nonsensical.

If one of the witnesses testified to personally

witnessing Ortega inflict the injuries for which he was charged, such testimony
would not be evaluated under I.R.E. 404(b) because it would relate to the very
acts with which Ortega was charged, not prior uncharged acts. There is simply
no requirement that witnesses providing evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) also be
eye-witnesses.
Ortega's alternative argument is that the "district court's assessment of
the evidence under I.R.E. 403 focused only on the temporal proximity of the
alleged uncharged conduct to the charged conduct."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10

(emphasis added).) This assertion is untrue. The entirety of the court's analysis
under I.R.E. 403's balancing requirement was:
Well, this evidence is highly relevant. It's close in time, it's
close in manner. It seems to me to establish a pattern of -- at a
minimum, a pattern that is relevant to the resolution of the issues in
this case.
I think its probative value outweighs substantially any
prejudicial effect, so I'm going to permit evidence of this type. It's
close enough in time. It's the type of conduct that is particularly
relevant, and it seems to me that this is properly admitted.
(10/15/2012 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-11.)
While the district court undoubtedly noted the "temporal proximity" of the
prior acts, which is a relevant consideration, Hassett, 124 Idaho at 363, 859 P.2d
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at 961, the record does not support Ortega's assertion that the court "only"
focused on "temporal proximity." Ortega cannot meet his burden by picking out
words that suit his argument and ignoring others that do not.
Ortega has failed to meet his burden of showing evidentiary error. 3

II.
Ortega Has Failed To Establish The Court Committed Instructional Error When It
Denied His Request For An Unapproved Jury Instruction
A.

Introduction
Ortega asserts the court erred by denying his request for an unapproved

jury instruction in which he sought to have the court instruct the jury "regarding
his rights to reasonably punish his child." (Appellant's Brief, p.11; R., p.84.) A
review of the applicable legal standards shows the district court correctly
concluded that Ortega was not entitled to such an unapproved instruction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this

Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d
414, 430 (2009).

C.

Ortega's Instructional Error Claim Fails
Refusal of a defendant's requested instructions dealing with the defense

theory is not error where the proposed statement is an erroneous statement of
the law.

State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 855, 26 P.3d 31, 38 (2001); State v.
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Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 817 P.2d 646 (1991); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,
736 P.2d 1327 (1987). While the appellate court "has upheld jury instructions
that do not strictly comply with those contained in the Idaho Criminal Jury
Instructions (ICJI)" the Idaho Supreme Court has cautioned that "any court which
varies from jury instructions previously approved by th[e] Court does so at
considerable risk that the verdict rendered will be overturned on appeal." State
v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2003) (quotations and citation
omitted). If the instructions, as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the law, the
instructions are not erroneous.

kL

The district court instructed the jury regarding the elements of felony
injury to child consistent with the pattern instruction for that offense, ICJI 1244.
(Compare R., pp.130, 132 with ICJI 1244.) The district court also provided the
jury with the definition of "willfully" that appears in the pattern instruction for ICJI
1244.

(Compare R., p.134 with ICJI 1244.)

Ortega, however, requested an

additional instruction "pursuant to State v. Peters[,] 116 Idaho 851 (Ct. App.
1989)," that he proposed should read as follows:
The State of Idaho recognizes that a parent may punish a child
using a reasonable amount of force to safeguard and promote the
child's welfare. A parent may punish a minor child for wrongdoing
so long as such punishment is for this beneficial purpose. The
punishment must not be excessive and the degree of harm to the
child must not exceed what is commonly viewed as reasonable in
light of the circumstances.
(R., pp.84-85.)

3 Although Ortega did not discuss the evidence of individual acts separately in
terms of their admissibility, even if this Court finds admission of evidence of any
individual act or acts error, the state submits the error is harmless.
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The district court rejected Ortega's request, stating:
. . . I did consider your additional proposed instruction based on
State versus Peters. And I decided not to use it, in part because
it's not one of the recommended jury instructions by the Criminal
Jury Instructions Committee, but also because the portion of the
case from which your language is taken is the portion of the case
that relates to the discussion about why the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague when applied to a situation where a
parent is unprotective, and so it relates to that portion where the -it relates to that portion of the case that is deciding whether a
reasonable person would be put on notice that they could be
charged under the injury to child statute for failing to protect their
minor child from treatment by somebody else.
And I did consider it, but then I also felt that, first, the
committee didn't go with that but, secondly, the elements of this
case are drawn directly from the statute. They, of course, are the
proposed criminal jury instructions from the committee, and the
statute talks about unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering.
And I believe that that's - encompasses a discussion about
whether something is unjustifiable or justifiable, and I believe that it
would be preferable not to create any possible confusion between
the language used in State versus Peters, which relates to a
different issue, and the statutory language, which says that you
can't inflict any unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering.
So "thoroughly" means that there is an implication that there
are justifiable actions that one could take, and so that's why I
decided not to use it, is I think that the argument can be made in
the context of the statutory language and the existing elements,
and I do think it's a proper argument to make.
(Trial Tr., p.441 , L.14 - p.443, L.2.)
The district court was exactly right. Not only was it advisable for the court
to give the approved instructions, as cautioned by the Idaho Supreme Court,
Young, supra, but the Peters case does not require that Ortega's requested
instruction be given.

As noted by the district court, the Court of Appeals in

Peters was addressing the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-1501 (1) when it
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"recognize[d] that a parent may punish a child using a reasonable amount of
force to safeguard and promote the child's welfare" and that a "parent may
punish a minor child for wrongdoing so long as such punishment is for this
beneficial purpose." 116 Idaho at 855,780 P.2d at 606. But, nowhere in Peters
does the Court state that a trial court is required to instruct the jury accordingly
when it considers a charge under I.C. § 18-1501(1). Instead, I.C. § 18-1501(1)
"is clear" that "a parent cannot willfully permit a child to be exposed to great
bodily injury without threat of criminal sanctions," Peters, supra, and, as the
district court noted, the elements instruction advises the jury that the actions
must be willful and unjustifiable in order to find the defendant guilty.
Ortega nevertheless argues that even if the language from Peters is dicta,
it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Young, and the Court of
Appeals' opinion in State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 75 P.3d 219 (Ct. App.
2003), which relied on Young. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-16.) Ortega is incorrect.
At issue in Young and Halbesleben was whether it was proper to give the
"generalized definition of willfully" from I.C. § 18-101 (1) when instructing the jury
on the elements of I.C. § 18-1501(1). Young, 138 Idaho at 373,64 P.3d at 299;
Halbesleben, 139 Idaho at 169, 75 P.3d at 223.

That generalized definition

states that '''wilfully,' when applied to the intent with which an act is done or
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to ... injure another .... "
I.C. § 18-101(1). The Court in Young concluded the general definition should not
be used because "Section 18-1501(1) tells the jury that the State must prove that
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[the defendant] willfully caused or permitted the child to suffer or inflicted
unjustifiable physical pain."

138 Idaho at 373, 64 P.3d at 299.

Giving the

general definition of willful, that no intent to injure is required, would be confusing
at best and misstate the law at worst. Young, 138 Idaho at 373, 64 P.3d at 299.
The Court of Appeals in Halbesleben, citing Young, unsurprising reached the
same conclusion. 139 Idaho at 169-170, 75 P.3d at 223-224.
The concern from Young and Halbesleben does not exist in this case
because the court did not give the general definition of willful; it gave the
definition set forth in the felony injury to child pattern instruction.

In fact, the

prosecutor submitted this instruction, noting that the definition of willfully needed
to be "tailored" to the felony injury to child charge. (Trial Tr., p.438, L.13 - p.439,
L.8.) Ortega's reliance on Young and Halbesleben to support his claim that he
was entitled to some additional instruction beyond those given is without merit.
Ortega has failed to show any error in his case.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdicts finding Ortega guilty of two counts of felony injury to child.
DATED this 10th day of February 2014.

JE: S CA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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